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All My Rights 
by Carl E. Schneider 
D iane Pretty was an English-woman in her early 40s who 
had been married nearly a 
quarter of a century. In November 
1999, she learned she had amyotrophic 
lateral sclerosis-in Britain, motor neu-
rone disease. Her condition deteriorated 
rapidly, and soon she was "essentially 
paralysed from the neck downwards."' 
She had "virtually no decipherable 
speech'' and was fed by a tube. She was 
expected to live only a few months or 
even weeks. AB a court later explained, 
however, "her intellect and capacity to 
make decisions are unimpaired. The 
final stages of the disease are exceeding-
ly distressing and undignified. AB she is 
frightened and distressed at the suffer-
ing and indignity that she will endure if 
the disease runs its course, she very 
strongly wishes to be able to control 
how and when she dies and thereby be 
spared that suffering and indignity." 
Suicide is not a crime in Britain, but 
assisting suicide is. On 27 July 2001, 
Mrs. Pretty's solicitor wrote the Director 
of Public Prosecutions asking for an as-
surance that her husband would not be 
prosecuted if he helped his wife commit 
suicide. The DPP refused because it 
would not "grant immunities that con-
done, require, or purport to authorise or 
permit the future commission of any 
criminal offence, no matter how excep-
tional the circumstances." 
On 20 August, Pretty sought judicial 
review of the DPP's decision. She con-
ceded she had no claim under "the com-
mon law of England," but she argued 
that a 1961 assisted suicide statute vio-
lated the European Convention on 
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Human Rights. On 29 November 
2001, the House of Lords affirmed a 
lower court's refusal to countermand 
the DPP's decision. The leading judg-
ment in the House of Lords analyzed 
the Convention's provisions at length 
and commented that its decision was 
"in accordance with a very broad inter-
national consensus. ABsisted suicide and 
consensual killing are unlawful in all 
Convention countries except the 
Netherlands, but even if [Dutch law] 
were operative in this country it would 
not relieve Mr Pretty of liability ... if he 
were to assist Mrs Pretty to take her 
own life." Mrs. Pretty had argued that 
she was not challenging the statute gen-
erally, but saying only it should not 
apply in "the particular facts of her case: 
that of a mentally competent adult who 
knows her own mind, is free from any 
pressure and has made a fully-informed 
and voluntary decision." The judgment 
invoked Dr. Johnson: "First, 'Laws are 
not made for particular cases but for 
men in general.' Second, 'To permit a 
law to be modified at discretion is to 
leave the community without law. It is 
to withdraw the direction of that public 
wisdom by which the deficiencies of 
private understanding are to be sup-
plied'.'' 
On 21 December 2001, Pretty took 
her case to the European Court of 
Human Rights. On 29 April, it rejected 
her claim. Four of her arguments the 
court readily dismissed. First was her ar-
gument that the 1961 act violated Arti-
cle 2 of the Convention: "Everyone's 
right to life shall be protected by law." 
Mrs. Pretty thought that article "pro-
tected the right to life and not life it-
self." The court concluded, however, 
that Article 2 could not "without a dis-
tortion of language, be interpreted as 
conferring the diametrically opposite 
right, namely a right to die.'' On the 
contrary, Article 2 was "first and fore-
most a prohibition on the use of lethal 
force or other conduct which might 
lead to the death of a human being.'' 
The court made similarly short shrift 
of Mrs. Pretty's argument that the 1961 
act violated Article 3: "No one shall be 
subjected to torture or to inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment." 
Mrs. Pretty alleged that the statute "dis-
closes inhuman and degrading treat-
ment for which the State is responsible 
as it will thereby be failing to protect 
her from the suffering which awaits her 
as her illness reaches its ultimate stages.'' 
But the court said that Article 3 was 
most commonly applied to "intention-
ally inflicted" acts of a state and that 
Mrs. Pretty's interpretation "places a 
new and extended construction on the 
concept of treatment.'' 
Nor did the court labor over Mrs. 
Pretty's claim that the 1961 act violated 
Article 9's protection of "freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion." The 
court honored Mrs. Pretty's convictions, 
but held that they did not "involve a 
form of manifestation of a religion or 
belief, through worship, teaching, prac-
tice or observance.'' 
Perhaps less easily, the court also dis-
missed Mrs. Pretty's claim that the 1961 
act violated Article 14's assurance that 
the Convention's rights "shall be secured 
without discrimination on any ground 
such as sex, race, [and] colour." The 
court said there was "objective and rea-
sonable justification for not distinguish-
ing in law between those who are and 
those who are not physically capable of 
committing suicide." The essence of the 
court's reason is that Mrs. Pretty's argu-
ment would open an exception to the 
prohibition on assisted suicide that 
would too greatly increase the risk that 
the vulnerable would be hustled toward 
unwanted deaths. 
More substantially, Mrs. Pretty in-
voked Article 8: "Everyone has the right 
to respect for his private and family 
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life." The court acknowledged that "the 
concept of private life is a broad term" 
that "covers the physical and psycholog-
ical integrity of a person." It also ac-
knowledged that although "no previous 
case has established as such any right to 
self-determination as being contained in 
Article 8 ... , ... the notion of person-
al autonomy is an important principle 
underlying the interpretation of its 
guarantees." And it acknowledged that 
the article protected the right to refuse 
medical treatments even if refusal meant 
death. Indeed, the court proclaimed 
that the "very essence of the Conven-
tion is respect for human dignity and 
intimate area of an individual's sexual 
life." But "States are entitled to regulate 
through the operation of the general 
criminal law activities which are detri-
mental to the life and safety of other in-
dividuals." The 1961 act "was designed 
to safeguard life by protecting the weak 
and vulnerable," especially "those who 
are not in a condition to take informed 
decisions." Perhaps Mrs. Pretry was not 
vulnerable, but "it is the vulnerability of 
the class which provides the rationale 
for the law in question." Furthermore, 
the court proposed to defer to member 
states: "It is primarily for States to assess 
the risk and the likely incidence of 
Both courts announced with cautious imprecision a 
right to freedom in making medical decisions. But both 
courts intimated that assisted suicide statutes 
serve legitimate ends. 
human freedom." Thus the court was 
"not prepared to exclude that" the 1961 
act "constitutes an interference" with 
Pretty's "right to respect for private life 
as guaranteed under Article 8 § 1." 
Section 1? Aye, there's the rub. Arti-
cle 8 has a second section which forbids 
"interference by a public authority'' 
with a Section 1 right unless that inter-
ference "is in accordance with the law 
and is necessary in a democratic society 
in the interests of national security, pub-
lic safety or the economic well-being of 
the country, for the prevention of disor-
der or crime, for the protection of 
health or morals, or for the protection 
of the rights and freedoms of others." 
Was the state's interference with Mrs. 
Pretty's asserted Section 1 right "neces-
sary"? Yes. The "notion of necessity im-
plies that the interference corresponds 
to a pressing social need and, in particu-
lar, that it is proportionate to the legiti-
mate aim pursued; in determining 
whether an interference is 'necessary in 
a democratic society', the Court will 
take into account that a margin of ap-
preciation is left to the national author-
ities." That "margin of appreciation" is 
"narrow as regards interferences in the 
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abuse if the general prohibition on as-
sisted suicides were relaxed or if excep-
tions were to be created. Clear risks of 
abuse do exist, notwithstanding argu-
ments as to the possibility of safeguards 
and protective procedures .... " 
But was not the 1961 act's flat ban 
on all assisted suicide overbroad? No, 
because the ban was not so absolute as 
the statute's text implied. Assisted sui-
cide could not be prosecuted without 
the DPP's approval, and courts could 
impose light sentences. In fact, "be-
tween 1981 and 1992 in 22 cases in 
which 'mercy killing' was an issue, there 
was only one conviction for murder, 
with a sentence for life imprisonment, 
while lesser offences were substituted in 
the others and most resulted in proba-
tion or suspended sentences." 
In short, Mrs. Pretty perhaps had a 
section 1 right, but the United King-
dom surely had a section 2 interest that 
justified its infringing that right. A 
state's laws may "reflect the importance 
of the right to life, by prohibiting assist-
ed suicide while providing for a system 
of enforcement and adjudication which 
allows due regard to be given in each 
particular case to the public interest in 
bringing a prosecution, as well as to the 
fair and proper requirements of retribu-
tion and deterrence." 
Comparisons between legal systems 
are notoriously perilous. Yet the Ameri-
can lawyer cannot help observing that 
despite abundant differences in attitude 
and approach between American and 
European courts,2 there are notable sim-
ilarities between the European Court of 
Human Rights' Pretty v. The United 
Kingdom and the U.S. Supreme Court's 
assisted suicide decision in Washington 
v. Glucksberg. Both courts interpreted 
"constitutional" provisions drafted in 
grand and spacious terms. Both courts 
announced with cautious imprecision a 
right to freedom in making medical de-
cisions. But both courts intimated that 
assisted suicide statutes serve legitimate 
ends, and both courts feared that abro-
gating those statutes would start the law 
down a lethally slippery slope. Finally, 
both courts apparently recoiled from 
the daunting labor of judicially devising 
and imposing a regime of assisted sui-
cide that would be legally convincing, 
administratively workable, and politi-
cally acceptable. 
When Mrs. Pretty learned of the 
court's decision, she said, "The law has 
taken all my rights away." On 3 May 
2002, she had breathing problems and 
was taken to a hospice. On 11 May, 
with her husband by her side, she died. 
Her death, the hospice director said, 
was "perfectly normal, natural and 
peaceful." 
1. All quotations are from the opinion of 
the European Court of Human Justice. 
2. C.E. Schneider, ''America as Panern and 
Problem," Hastings Center Report 30 (2000): 
20. 
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